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INTRODUCTION
Liberty and equality are salient characteristics of any legal order. Of the
two, liberty emerged first in this country. Indeed, the stirring preamble to the
Constitution of the United States testifies to the preeminent place that "the
Blessings of Liberty" held in the esteem of the Framers. The Bill of Rights,
whose bicentennial we now celebrate, is largely concerned with rights of
liberty, not rights of equality. Its emphasis on liberty is not difficult to
explain. The American Revolution was largely a war over liberty. The Bill of
Rights represented the fruition of a conflict fought to secure both freedom of
self-governance and freedom from the reach of the omnipresent state.
Like the American Revolution, the Civil War was fought, in part, for
powerful ideals. If the ideals of liberty and self-governance inspired the
revolution, then the concepts of union, and later the first glimmers of
equality, animated war aims in the North. The idea of equality became bound
up in the ideal of freedom. However, even the conjoining of liberty and
equality was not enough to prevent the Emancipation Proclamation from
being Lincoln's most unpopular act at the time.
The fourteenth amendment embodied both wartime goals: union and
equality. By its terms, the amendment operated as an express prohibition
upon the states, and its command was, in some inchoate sense, an equalizing
one. Although the word "equal" had appeared in the Constitution before,
this amendment marked the first time that equality had appeared in any
meaningful, aspirational sense. Thus, with the fourteenth amendment, liberty
and equality, the two cornerstones of our constitutional system, were in place,
and securely so, because each reflected the formative conflicts of our national
experience.
Ironically, both constitutional liberty and constitutional equality took a
long time to flower after these formative amendments took effect. The
liberties represented in the Bill of Rights were not dramatically expanded
until Justice Black's seminal dissent in Adamson v. CaliforniaI laid the
groundwork for later incorporation of most Bill of Rights provisions to the
states. The dramatic debate between the liberty represented by local self-
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governance and the liberty represented by a national application of our
fundamental freedoms was joined only after World War II.
Similarly, the idea of constitutional equality took hold too belatedly.
Exaggerated laissez-faire and a stultifying racism dominated the late
nineteenth century and prevented constitutional equality from developing.
Many of the Supreme Court's interventions in the first and fourth decades of
this century were on behalf of privilege and property, 2 despite the presence of
Chief Justice Fuller and, later, Chief Justice Hughes, who were ambivalent
about that course. As with the late-developing debate over incorporation, the
idea of national constitutional equality began to emerge only in the aftermath
of World War II. Its emergence was attributable to many causes, but none so
much as the modern civil rights movement. Questions of racial dignity and
equality began reaching the courts in the 1950s and 1960s in record numbers,
not only because black plaintiffs challenged the existence of Jim Crow
legislation, but also because authorities used trespass and disorderly conduct
laws to quell civil rights demonstrations, which eventually brought black
defendants to the Supreme Court.3
II
THE SEVERAL DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY
The ideal of racial justice lies at the core of modern constitutional equality.
The dimensions of constitutional equality are, however, remarkably diverse. I
shall try to explore several of these different dimensions of equality and
address a few of the major cases associated with each. This exploration will
ask what aspects of equality judges are permitted or obligated to promote.
The answers in this controversial field are anything but simple. To say that
Americans have enormously different views of equality, as well as of the role
of the judiciary in achieving this equality, understates the problem. Although
equality is a subject that is guaranteed to elude consensus, there should be
some settled areas. For those areas that are unsettled, we should at least
attempt to define the parameters of debate.
A. Equality of Ideas and Beliefs
All ideas and faiths must be equal in the eyes of the state. The first
amendment, more than the equal protection clause, is the source of this first
species of equality. Both the speech and religious clauses of the first
amendment have, without question, a strong equality component. Although
the state is free to promote its own programmatic agenda, it is not free to do
so by suppressing ideas that it disagrees with or even those it finds heretical.
2. See, for example, Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905) (invalidating state maximum work
hours law); Morehead v Vew York, 298 US 587 (1936) (invalidating state minimum wage law).
3. See, for example, Adderley' v Florida, 385 US 39 (1966).
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All ideas are equal, and as such, the state must permit expression of the most
and least agreeable among them. 4
In the area of religious faith, the idea of equality is even more strictly
enforced. The establishment clause makes it clear that the state is not
permitted a positive religious agenda of any sort. Furthermore, under the
free exercise clause, the state is not permitted to restrict observance of any
religious faith. In contrast to the speech prong of the first amendment, the
religion clauses impose an obstacle to the promotion, as well as to the
discouragement, of any faith or tenet by the government. Equality of belief is
promoted in the purest sense.
Despite the fundamental commitment to equality of ideas and beliefs in
the first amendment, the notion of equality has still proven elusive or
incomplete. For example, equality of ideas has never been thought to
guarantee an equal amplification of the voices expressing ideas. An
incumbent has a more potent forum than does a challenger; a TV
anchorperson will be heard by millions more than a sidewalk orator; a wealthy
citizen has a constitutionally protected right to spend large sums on his own
campaign and may be able to purchase a forum for his message. 5 Thus, to
some extent, freedom has been dominant over equality in first amendment
law.
Freedom has not, however, won a complete victory over equality. The
tension between the two was evident in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,6
where the Court upheld a Michigan law prohibiting the use of general
corporate funds for independent expenditures to candidates in state elections.
Justice Marshall's majority opinion struck a note of equality in deploring the
unfair influence of corporate wealth in state elections. Justice Kennedy
remonstrated against the majority's attempt to "equalize the relative influence
of speakers." '7
In the religion cases, it is unclear which of two competing views is most
consistent with the fundamental premise of equality. The exemptionist view,
most prominently identified with Wisconsin v. Yoder,8 holds that the failure to
except unconventional religious practices from the general operation of
secular legislation in effect condemns those faiths to unequal treatment. The
neutralist view, most prominently identified now with Oregon v. Smith,9 holds
that finding constitutionally compelled exemptions for religious conduct from
neutral "generally applicable" law is itself an example of unequal treatment.' 0
Thus, general agreement on the proposition that the religion clauses
4. United States v Schwimmer, 279 US 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes dissenting) ("[I]f there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the
principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought
that we hate.").
5. Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 51-54 (1976).
6. 494 US 652 (1990).
7. Id at 704.
8. 406 US 205 (1972).
9. 494 US 872 (1990).
10. Id at 885.
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prescribe equality of religious belief breaks down when it becomes difficult to
determine exactly what equal treatment of religious communities means.
B. Equality of Participation
Participatory equality sprang from a series of cases establishing the
requirement of equal population for state legislative and congressional
districts, popularly known as the "one person, one vote" rule. Baker v. Carr,I"
Reynolds v. Sims,' 2 and Wesberry v. Sanders 13 are the seminal decisions in this
area. If dilution of a person's vote was not to be countenanced, then certainly
denial of the right to vote appeared even more repugnant. A spate of
Supreme Court opinions in the 1960s and 197 0s swept away various barriers
to voting rights and ballot access.' 4 The salutary thrust of these decisions was
to broaden and equalize political participation. One of these decisions, Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections,' 5 invalidated a poll tax that was neutral on its face
but discriminatory in effect. The decision evoked what became perhaps the
most famous outcry against contemporary constitutional equality:
It was not too long ago that Mr. Justice Holmes felt impelled to remind the Court that
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment does not enact the laissez-faire
theory of society .... The times have changed, and perhaps it is appropriate to
observe that neither does the Equal Protection Clause of that Amendment rigidly
impose upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarianism.
16
The idea of participatory equality, however, was not confined either to
politics or to the equal protection clause. In a broader sense, participatory
equality sought to ensure that indigent persons would be placed on a more
equal footing with respect to the many governmental decisions that affected
them. For example, Gideon v. Wainwright '7 promoted a greater equality of
participation within the criminal justice system by guaranteeing to indigents
the appointment of counsel in felony cases. This guarantee was later
extended to all instances where imprisonment would be imposed.' 8 Similarly,
Goldberg v. Kelly 19 promoted participatory equality with respect to bureaucratic
decisions by mandating a hearing before certain welfare benefits were
withdrawn.
All of these decisions afforded less affluent Americans a greater right of
participation in the various processes of government, whether the vehicle was
11. 369 US 186 (1962) (reapportionment cases are justiciable under the equal protection
clause).
12. 377 US 533 (1964) (state legislative seats must be apportioned substantially on a population
basis).
13. 376 US 1 (1964) (congressional districts).
14. See, for example, Harper v Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663 (1966) (state poll tax); Kramer v
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 US 621 (1969) (property requirement); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US
330 (1972) (durational residency requirement). See also William v. Rhodes, 393 US 23 (1968)
(invalidating barriers to ballot access).
15. 383 US 663 (1966).
16. Id at 686 (Harlan dissenting) (citing Lochner, 198 US 45, 75-76).
17. 372 US 335 (1963).
18. Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25 (1972).
19. 397 US 254 (1970).
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that of the sixth amendment or the due process clause. In Gideon, the Court
combined the idea of equality with the importance of presuming the
individual liberty of innocent persons. In Goldberg, the Court expanded the
realm of property from strict notions of realty and personalty, encompassing a
range of less tangible entitlements to public employment and assistance. 20
Most of the decisions stopped short of requiring the achievement of
complete equality. After all, the sixth amendment gives an indigent
defendant the right to an appointed counsel, not to the public payment of the
fees of any person retained by an indigent defendant. 21 All of the cases
granting participatory equality to indigents focus on procedural remedies.
The cases do not guarantee that the outcome of an election, the verdict of a
jury, the decision of a bureaucrat, or the action of a public employer will be
favorable, or even correct. The cases carefully balance the desirability of
greater procedural safeguards against the dangers of governmental
immobility. 22 These decisions, however, suggest that courts will allow the
imposition of substantial public costs in order to ensure that public processes
will be more fair.
C. Equality under the Law
The basic notion of equality under the law is a simple and appealing one:
no one is above the law. The idea has been with us at least since Runnymede.
The most celebrated modern embodiment of this concept is contained in
United States v. Nixon,23 where the Court held that even the President of the
United States was subject to legal process designed to obtain evidence for a
pending criminal trial. The events of Watergate placed a renewed emphasis
upon the notion that all persons were subject to the law. The Ethics in
Government Act of 197824 expressed the desire of Congress that high
executive branch officials remain accountable. The Court upheld the act
against separation of powers objections in Morrison v. Olson.2 5 In Morrison, as
in Nixon, contentions that the ethics act compromised the independence of the
executive branch fell victim to the Court's and Congress's conclusion that
executive privilege is not absolute and that no official is above the law.
The engrafting of legal accountability onto political accountability in the
Nixon and Morrison decisions was a portentous step. It represented, in
essence, a loss of faith in the curative potential of democracy and an
increasing determination to use the law as an antidote to perceived abuses by
the powerful and privileged. The United States Sentencing Commission
20. See Bell v Burson, 402 US 535 (1971) (driver's license); Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 (1972)
(state employment); Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565 (1975) (school attendance).
21. See, for example, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v United States, 491 US 617, 624 (1989)
("IThose who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long
as they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts.").
22. See, for example, Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319 (1976).
23. 418 US 683 (1974).
24. Pub L No 95-521, 92 Stat 1824, codified at 2 USCS §§ 288 et seq (1991).
25. 487 US 654 (1988).
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recently promulgated guidelines that emphasized this theme of equality under
the law.2 6
Much the same debate over equality under the law for persons in high
places is occurring with respect to state officials charged in federal court with
violating federal constitutional rights. The doctrine of sovereign immunity
has traditionally protected the state from suit and appears to subordinate
notions of equality under law to the ancient adage that "the king can do no
wrong." As with senior executive officials, the historical antidote for potential
abuse was thought to be political. The people, through their legislative voice,
can abrogate the sovereign immunity concept anytime they choose.
However, the great battle in this area of equality is not being fought in
legislatures, but rather in those cases defining immunity for defendants in
actions under 42 USC section 1983. Those who hold a strict view of equality
under the law argue for a restrictive definition of immunity on the grounds
that no executive official, no matter how powerful, should be free to violate
the constitutional rights of the citizenry with impunity. Others believe that
enforcing strict equality under the law through the withdrawal of executive
immunity would make enforcement of the law impossible. The debate creates
a stunning paradox. To preserve enforcement of the law, and ultimately the
rule of law, some dispensation by way of immunity must plainly be granted to
executive officials. The appeal, however, of the ideal of equality under law
continues to manifest itself in the Supreme Court's reluctance to confer
grants of immunity from the Civil Rights Act in an absolute, rather than a
qualified, form.27
D. Equality of Status
Equality of status addresses the fundamental constitutional prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of status or membership in a racial, ethnic,
or gender-based group. Legislation that classifies on these suspect bases is
subject to the strictest constitutional scrutiny. In a sense, footnote four of
United States v. Carolene Products Co. 28 foreshadowed the concept of the suspect
classification by calling for a "searching judicial inquiry" of statutes
evidencing "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities."2 9
However, the political power of these minorities has grown substantially in
the years since Carolene Products. Statutes designed to protect the rights not
only of racial and ethnic minorities and women, but also of the aged,30 the
26. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1988, codified at 18 USC
§ 3551 (1988). The Supreme Court upheld the guidelines against separation of powers objections,
noting the power of Congress to provide for more uniform and determinate sentencing. Mistretta v
United States, 488 US 361 (1989).
27. See, for example, Forrester v White, 484 US 219 (1988) (no absolute immunity for judges
exercising administrative rather than judicial powers).
28. 304 US 144 (1938).
29. Id at 152-53 n4.
30. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602, codified as
amended at 29 USC §§ 621-34 (1988).
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handicapped,3' and the mentally ill and retarded 32 demonstrate the increased
political power of these groups. The action in the area of discrimination has
switched, to a considerable extent, from the constitutional realm to hotly
debated questions of statutory construction. Congress's reaction to the
Supreme Court's interpretation of civil rights laws in Grove City College v. Bell,33
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 34 and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 35
demonstrates that the critical cases now focus on the scope and coverage of
federal anti-discrimination legislation rather than the invalidation of
discriminatory state laws. The shift is a measure of the progress made in
rooting out the more overt manifestations of inequality of status. With this
shift, conflict has diminished somewhat between the federal judiciary and the
states, but the potential for conflict between the Court and Congress may be
growing.
One wonders how constitutional doctrine will adapt to this political
change. The concept of the suspect classification was never an entirely tidy
tool of constitutional jurisprudence. Under this concept, some classes are
suspect, while other classes are only semi-suspect. The lines between
minimal, intermediate, and strict scrutiny of various classifications have always
been blurred. 36 Although the earliest suspect classification cases almost
always involved de jure discrimination against classes, debate has raged over
how defacto classifications should be scrutinized. Finally, the Carolene Products
rationale for suspect classifications-protecting discrete and insular
minorities-has been sorely tested by white or male plaintiffs contesting
affirmative action plans. 37 Such lawsuits underscore a certain confusion in the
concept of suspect classifications and in the reasons why suspect status is
conferred upon certain groups. Was it the group's minority status, powerless
position, or the invidious, nature of legal distinctions resting upon immutable
characteristics that caused suspect status to be conferred upon it?
The danger exists here that one may miss the forest by looking only at the
trees. The vehicle of the suspect classification has taught Americans more
about the intrinsic nature of discrimination than any other constitutional
device. Attitudinal stereotypes are at the heart of discriminatory laws. In
invalidating overbroad classifications under the equal protection clause, the
courts struck equally at the underlying fallacies of racial, sexual, and ethnic
stereotypes. Additionally, releasing individuals from legal subjugation on the
basis of some supposed group characteristic promotes both paramount
constitutional values. The soundest constitutional decisions may be those that
31. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-112, 87 Stat 355, codified at 29 USC §§ 701 et seq
(1988).
32. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub L No 96-247, 94 Stat 349, codified as
amended at 42 USC §§ 1997-1997j (1988).
33. 465 US 555 (1984).
34. 490 US 642 (1989).
35. 491 US 164 (1989).
36. See Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 Harv L Rev 1
(1972).
37. See, for example, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978).
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do not involve agonizing tradeoffs between liberty and equality. In advancing
the fourteenth amendment ideal of equal and individualized treatment of all
citizens regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, the courts have advanced the
great constitutional ideal of liberty as well.
E. Equality of Opportunity
Equality of opportunity in America is certainly not a matter that any
branch of government can simply ignore. However, equality of opportunity is
the most open-ended dimension of equality that I have discussed. It presents
a staggering definitional difficulty, especially for the courts. For example, is
equality of opportunity promoted or undermined by affirmative action plans
or by public assistance programs? The answers to such questions are highly
value-laden, and the costs to the judiciary in entering the argument are always
steep. As a philosophical matter, one might argue that equality of
opportunity cannot be secured until inequalities of means are eliminated. As
a practical matter, however, such an enterprise lies beyond the reach of the
most committed court. The danger of an untempered endorsement of
equality of opportunity as a goal of the equal protection clause should be
apparent.
The Supreme Court has had to pick carefully the areas in which to
promote the goal of equality of opportunity. At first blush, the most likely
area may appear to be education, both because it was the setting of the Brown
decision and because it represents the most direct means of upward mobility
and self-betterment. Educational opportunity is, in the public mind, free of
the stigmatic debate over "handouts" that may accompany the more direct
forms of public welfare assistance. However, two major Texas school cases of
the past two decades serve to underscore the difficulties of a judicial venture
on behalf of equality of educational opportunity. In San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,38 the formidable complexity of school finance and
educational policies forced the Court's restraint with respect to financial
disparities among school districts. The school system's operations comprised
a veritable educational thicket that dwarfed even the "political thicket" 3 9 that
had long counseled judicial restraint under the political question doctrine.
However, this theme of surpassing and intractable complexity apparently did
not deter the majority in the other great Texas school case, Plyler v. Doe.40 In
Plyler, the Court held Texas's denial of free public education to illegal aliens a
violation of the equal protection clause. The various opinions supporting the
result are as replete with warm thoughts as with workable doctrine. The
doctrinal difficulty is that burdens upon educational rights must be supported
by legitimate public interests, and in the course of disapproving those various
interests in Plyler, the Court came close to installing its own educational
preferences.
38. 411 US 1 (1973).
39. Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter).
40. 457 US 202 (1982).
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Certainly, the compassionate, and probably the wisest, view holds that
more money spent on the children of illegal immigrants today will cut the
"costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime" 4' tomorrow. However, that
argument would literally support a limitless range of judicially mandated
educational expenditures. In fact, the Court seemed to recognize that its
rationale should be reserved for the most egregious cases, those involving
outright denials of education rather than relative deprivations. 42 The
problems in American education today are vast and varied, but it seems clear
that in resolving them, we shall have to place much of our faith in state
courts 43 and in democracy.
F. Economic Equality
The flashing amber lights that cause courts to show restraint with regard
to equality of opportunity begin to turn red in the area of economic equality.
Dandridge v. Williams4 4 sent the signal that the Court would approach
questions of economic equality with caution. Although not a landmark case in
popular circles, Dandridge has become a critical underpinning of modern
judicial restraint. The Court upheld an upper limit placed by the state of
Maryland on the total amount of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") benefits that any Single family could receive, even though that
family's standard of need as computed by the state would not be met by the
grant. Justice Marshall was quite candid in dissent:
It is the individual interests here at stake that, as the Court concedes, most clearly
distinguish this case from the "business regulation" equal protection cases. AFDC
support to needy dependent children provides the stuff that sustains those children's
lives: food, clothing, shelter.
4 5
Dandridge demonstrates that the social importance of a burdened right "is
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict
scrutiny." 46 In fact, it is difficult to think the matter could be otherwise. If a
correlation was made between social importance and constitutional solicitude,
a society committed to democratic governance would soon find the lion's
share of its business transferred to the courts. Of course, the existence of a
fundamental constitutional right to welfare might not dictate to Congress how
to fund it any more than a right to counsel has precluded different methods of
funding legal representation. However, the judiciary would face the
temptation to police programs of public assistance for their adequacy or to
judge the relative fairness of distributions to different classes of beneficiaries.
The wrangling over budgets and deficits that takes place each year in
Congress and in state legislatures is the ultimate grist for the political mill.
41. Id at 230.
42. Id at 234-35 (Blackmun concurring); id at 239 n3 (Powell concurring).
43. See, for example, Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v Kirby, 777 SW2d 391 (Tex 1989) (holding
school financing system violated the Texas Constitution).
44. 397 US 471 (1970).
45. Id at 522 (Marshall dissenting).
46. Rodriqiie, 411 US at 32.
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Elected officials should be allowed to struggle over questions of taxation and
expenditure without an overlay of fundamental economic rights imposed by
the Supreme Court. Such a set of rights would consist of little more than a
thinly veiled judicial fiscal policy with a tilt toward social welfare spending and
would offend Article I's allocation of powers to the legislative branch. The
amelioration of poverty is one of those desirable ends which have generated
endless controversy as to means, and the intersection of a democratic polity
with market forces is what political discourse is about. Of course, laws that
single out the poor for punitive treatment or that burden an individual's
participatory rights should not escape judicial scrutiny, but in the end, policies
of distribution are what the more important congressional committees have
been created to debate.
G. Numerical Equality
The final dimension of equality involves the achievement of numerical
proportionality among racial and ethnic groups, particularly in the schools
and in the workplace. This profoundly controversial category of equality links
decisions in such areas as school busing and affirmative action. The reasoning
on numerical equality can generally be divided into two approaches: forward-
looking or aspirational, and backward-looking or reparational. Several of the
opinions in Bakke 47 furnish well-known examples of the reparational
approach. Both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall in their separate
opinions discussed this country's tragic history of slavery and Jim Crow laws.
The university justified its admissions policy partly on the basis of a desire to
remedy past discrimination. In contrast, Chief Justice Warren's opinion in
Brown represents an aspirational approach. 48 He made limited mention of
history and instead defined a goal of non-discrimination in public schools
without extended reference to the wrongs that had been done to blacks
earlier.
Both the aspirational and reparational approaches have their function, but
the struggle is over how to combine these approaches to achieve a true
measure of equality. For some, the United States' history of racial
discrimination requires a lengthy period of continuing rectification, making
measures such as the race-conscious allocation ofjobs and college admissions
constitutionally permissible. Others feel that every racial distinction in law
only prolongs racial perceptions in society. For them, the goal of a color-
blind Constitution is so compelling, and the continuation of government-
sponsored discrimination so pernicious, that the end of all racial
classifications must begin now.
The debate centers on a disagreement over the proper use of history as a
basis of and a limit to judicial intervention. 49 Every civil rights case requires
47. 438 US 265 (1978).
48. Brown v Bd. Educ. of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954).
49. Both sides of the affirmative action debate appear to recognize the important role that this
disagreement plays. See the stimulating discussion of the temporal element in the Court's earlier
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some historical inquiry because without a past violation of a right, a court
cannot provide a remedy. It is not clear, however, how broadly into the past
the inquiry must reach. The more narrowly defined the past discrimination
and injury, the more guidance these past wrongs give courts in determining
appropriate remedies. As Justice Powell noted in Bakke, there is a difference
between remedying "wrongs worked by specific instances of racial
discrimination," and remedying "the effects of 'societal discrimination,' an
amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past." 50
The reparational approach in civil rights law has developed primarily in
the two areas that have promised the greatest upward mobility-education
and employment. Predictably, however, the reparational view of law has also
met its toughest opposition in the same two areas. The ideals of individual
opportunity and individual merit-two critical elements of the aspirational
vision-have combined to resist class-based reparations and remedies. The
dilemma has been profound. In education, the reparational approach is
expressed in the constitutional obligation of most school districts to
"dismantle dual school systems"5 1 that have been intentionally segregated by
school authorities in violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. In 1968, the Supreme Court in Green v. County School Board of New
Kent County, Virginia52 charged dual school systems with the affirmative duty to
eliminate the vestiges of racial discrimination root and branch by taking all
necessary steps to convert to a unitary system. In 1971, the Court in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 53 made it clear that the constitutional
obligation to dismantle dual school systems might entail the compulsory
transportation of students. The Supreme Court has limited transportation
remedies in school desegregation cases, however, to reflect the actual record
of prior segregation. 54 In Milliken v. Bradley, for example, the Court observed
that "[d]isparate treatment.., occurred within the Detroit school system, and
not elsewhere, and on this record the remedy must be limited to that
system." 55
Although the duty to dismantle dual systems has been the reparational
focus of educational numerical equality, there has also been an aspirational
focus. At some point, courts must confine the historical inquiry and begin
moving the constitutional focus from the past to the future. A natural period
of contrition and atonement must eventually give way to a fresh inquiry into
the present imperatives of justice. In constitutional law, this idea of a fresh
start is embodied in a concept known as "unitariness." When a school district
affirmative action decisions in Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action
Cases, 100 Harv L Rev 78 (1986).
50. Bakke, 438 US at 307 (Powell).
51. Swann v Charlotte-AMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 US 1, 22 (1971).
52. 391 US 430, 437-38 (1968).
53. 402 US 1 (1971).
54. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v Brinkman, 433 US 406 (1977); Pasadena Citly Bd. of Educ. v Spangler, 427
US 424 (1976); Milliken z, Bradley, 418 US 717 (1974).
55. 418 US at 746.
Page 235: Winter 1992]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
achieves a unitary system, the constitutional obligation of that school district
to make amends for historic segregation through race-conscious remedies
ends.
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell,56 the Supreme
Court recently revisited the issue of when a school district's obligations to
correct past discrimination have been satisfied. The Court held that
injunctions in school desegregation cases could be dissolved if the affected
school board "had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since
it was entered, and ... the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated
to the extent practicable." 57 The Court emphasized that consideration of the
latter factor requires an examination of" 'every facet of school operations-
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities.' "58 Even
after an injunction imposing a desegregation plan has been terminated, the
school board's policies are still subject to challenge under the equal
protection clause.5 9
The decision in Dowell nevertheless leaves many questions unanswered. It
is not clear whether or to what extent the Court will permit voluntary
affirmative action plans in a unitary system. More importantly, it is not clear
exactly what school districts and school boards must to do maintain a unitary
system and avoid repeating the sad and traumatic experience from which they
have only recently emerged. For those school districts under federal court
control, unitariness has been an ill-defined hope that they may one day return
to a measure of self-governance, and that quality education may become the
determinant of decisions on hiring, curriculum, construction, and assignment.
For education, after all, is what schools are about.
The Supreme Court's views on affirmative action programs are even more
complex. In recent years, the Court has seemed to reject the full reparationist
view, which argues that the general societal history of slavery and segregation
support present affirmative action efforts, in favor of subjecting race-
conscious employment programs to a higher level of scrutiny. Such programs
"'must be justified by a compelling governmental interest' "60 and "the
means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be 'narrowly tailored
to the achievement of that goal.' "61 Where a specific institution has
discriminated against minorities previously, the Court has upheld court-
ordered affirmative action programs for that institution. 6 2 For example, in
56. 111 S Ct 630 (1991).
57. Id at 638.
58. Id, quoting Green v New Kent County School Bd., 391 US at 435.
59. Id. The Court cited Washington v Davis, 426 US 299 (1976), and Arlington Heights v
M'letropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 US 252 (1977), as establishing the appropriate equal
protection principles for such challenges.
60. Wllygant vJackson Bd. of Educ., 476 US 267, 274 (1986) , quoting Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429,
432 (1984).
61. Id at 274, quoting Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 480 (1980).
62. See, for example, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int l Ass 'n v Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm 'n, 478 US 421 (1986).
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United States v. Paradise,63 the Court upheld a one-for-one promotions quota in
a police department that had a history of persistent discrimination against
blacks. On the other hand, the Court has also cautioned that ajustification for
racial quotas consisting of "a generalized assertion that there has been past
discrimination in an entire industry . . . 'has no logical stopping point.' "64
After making this observation, the Court went on to strike down Richmond's
set-aside system that reserved 30 percent of the city's construction contracts
for minority businesses because there was no evidence of illegal
discrimination in the city's construction industry. 65 Richmond's desire to
remedy past discrimination in construction in general could not
constitutionally justify such a rigid racial preference.
Such cases indicate that the Court has been moving closer to the
aspirational view that race-conscious programs may serve narrow remedial
purposes but not broad reparational ends. However, the Court's application
of strict scrutiny to the race-conscious actions of cities and states is in contrast
to the apparently more lenient equal protection scrutiny given
congressionally mandated affirmative action programs. In Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. V. F.C.C. ,66 the Court revisited its opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick 67 and
reaffirmed that judicial deference is appropriate when Congress imposes
benign race-conscious measures that substantially relate to important
governmental objectives. Significantly, Congress's stated objective in
granting certain preferences to minority and female broadcasting license
applicants was to increase broadcast diversity, not to compensate victims of
past governmental or societal discrimination. The dissent protested that the
Federal Communication Commission's interest in increasing diversity was too
amorphous to justify racial classifications, and that the granting of these
preferences went beyond Congress's power under the fourteenth amendment
to remedy past discrimination in the states. 68
Although increasing diversity in broadcasting may appear a legitimate
aspirational end,6 9 relying on this rationale to justify set-asides may also
promote reparational goals. In a country as heterogeneous as the United
States, it is clear that diversity is a desirable goal that needs encouragement.
However, the benefits of diversity can invariably be invoked on behalf of every
set-aside. In fact, the more rigid the set-aside, the greater the diversity it can
arguably achieve. Thus, although diversity as a general matter is a desirable
goal, diversity as a justification for every numerical set-aside becomes another
reparational device. The law of affirmative action can neither be broadly
reparational, nor can it ignore historical wrongs. Rather than discussing the
63. 480 US 149 (1987).
64. Richmond vJ.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469, 498 (1989), quoting IWygant, 476 US at 275.
65. Id at 500-06.
66. 110 S Ct 2997 (1990).
67. 448 US 448 (1980).
68. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S Ct at 3034 (O'Connor dissenting).
69. For the view that such diversity provides a legitimate aspirational basis for affirmative action,
see Sullivan, 100 Harv L Rev 78 (cited in note 49).
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proper role of history in justifying race-conscious programs, Metro Broadcasting
risks uncoupling such programs from remedial purposes entirely. Such a
complete uncoupling through the device of diversity would give proponents
of reparational policies as much a blank check for racial classifications as was
provided by the earlier carte blanche of rectifying societal discrimination.
The ultimate question is whether equality means equality for individuals or
equality for groups. If our society is to be governed under a rule of law, then
our legal system must eventually rise above race. Our laws must have
regularity and generality, and they must apply equally to all individuals. We
are, first and foremost, human beings, not blacks or whites. As such, citizens
deserve to stand before the law as individuals, not merely as representatives of
a race. More common attributes unite us as members of the human race than
can ever divide us by classification into other categories. This is not an
exhortation to forget, for Americans must confront the ugly aspects of our
history, including the eras of slavery and Jim Crow laws. There are
differences, however, between learning from history and making it a basis for
endless rounds of new decisions based on race. An aspirational approach to
civil rights cases helps to ensure that the mistakes of the past will not be
repeated, and that respect for the dignity of the individual human being
transcends and overshadows all else.
III
THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN PROMOTING CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY
This brief survey of the dimensions of constitutional equality should make
it apparent that the justification for judicial intervention on behalf of equality
depends largely upon the kind of equality being promoted. In analyzing the
equal protection clause, it is important to recognize that the concept of
equality is capable of categorization and that such categorization is necessary
to develop rationales both for intervention and restraint. 70  The
categorization and refinement of the question of equality are a remarkable
phenomenon in constitutional law. For most of our nation's history, the idea
of any judicial role on behalf of equal treatment would have been
controversial.
The increased judicial role in promoting equality is mainly a modern
phenomenon. Most of the major cases date from the Warren and Burger
Courts. The modern nature of judicial intervention may impart a sense of
inevitability to the notion that the judicial branch will continue to promote
greater equality among citizens. The corollary of this notion is that the
judiciary will acquiesce in legislative efforts designed to reduce disparities
among citizens. Many contemporary students of constitutional law believe
that whether the means be intervention or restraint, the judiciary will achieve
greater equality as an end result.
70. SeeJ. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of
Constitutional EqualitY, 61 Va L Rev 945 (1975).
[Vol. 55: No. I
DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN EQUALITY
This perception overlooks much about the Court's history. For instance, a
student of constitutional law in 1937 might have been just as certain that the
natural role of courts was to serve as bastions of protection for the privileged.
The Court seemed to have the necessary constitutional tools to accomplish
that task: the contracts clause, 7' the takings clause, 72 the tenth amendment,
the implied distinction between regulable commerce and unregulable
production, 73 and, above all else, substantive due process. 74 Two of the more
formidable judicial intellects of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Justice David Brewer and Justice George Sutherland, led the Court
to strike down in the name of laissez-faire concededly rational legislative
enactments designed to improve the conditions of American workers. In fact,
the federal judiciary represented a major obstacle to the achievement of many
fundamental reforms of the workplace, such as the minimum wage. 75 Until
the arrival of the first Roosevelt appointees to the Court, few regulations of
business practices could avoid attack in federal court as violations of the due
process clause, because the Court had broadly read the component of liberty
to include not only freedom from physical restraint, but freedom of contract
as well. 76
Although the commerce clause decisions of the Roosevelt Court77 put
decisively to rest many issues of judicial intervention on behalf of economic
liberty, the debate over the desirability of intervention has continued among
conservative constitutional scholars. For example, Professor Richard
Epstein's restrictive view of the commerce power 78 would invalidate a host of
federal labor laws, and his expansive reading of the takings clause 79 would
nullify equally fundamental redistributionist legislation, such as the
progressive income tax and other New Deal social legislation. His attempt to
constitutionalize the unfettered market drew a sharp retort from none other
than Judge Robert Bork.80 Although this skirmish between the two scholars is
not likely to disturb the settled doctrine of the courts, it is useful as a historical
reminder of the judicial influence constitutional laissez-faire doctrine had
during the pre-Roosevelt era. The debate also highlights the subjective
nature of arguments that an emphatic vision of constitutional equality or of
constitutional inequality born of market conditions requires the invalidation
of legislative acts.
71. US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1.
72. Id at Amend V.
73. Id at Art 1, § 8, cl 3.
74. See, for example, Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
75. See Adkins v Children's Hosp., 261 US 525 (1923).
76. See Lochner, 198 US at 53.
77. See, for example, NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1 (1937); United States v
lrightwood Dairy Co., 315 US 110 (1942); and Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111 (1942).
78. See Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va L Rev 1387 (1987).
79. See Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard U
Press, 1985).
80. Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 230 (Free Press, 1990).
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The nature of our political system presupposes not an overarching vision
of equality, but rather a subtle interplay between market conditions and those
corrective measures democratic institutions enact. The basic ingredients of
this interplay are common knowledge. Simply put, the classic market rewards
both skills and risks. Any market failing to reward these two qualities stifles
the incentives necessary to maximize the larger sense of public well-being that
the myriad instances of individual initiative are supposed to produce. A
healthy market, for example, will presumably provide fertile conditions for
raising venture capital and suitable rewards for the development of
sophisticated skills indispensable to an increasingly demanding workplace. Of
course, such a market will produce its share of business failures, and it may
shut out a significant number of workers who fail to develop the skills
necessary for changing conditions. Since many of these same citizens will also
lack the inherited advantages made possible by the private transmission of
wealth, their circumstances may be poignant.
Nothing in the Constitution makes the market sacrosanct. The
Constitution does not forbid an array of public policies designed to maximize
training and educational opportunities for those who have insufficient means
of acquiring them. The Constitution does not prohibit an array of
redistributionist policies in the form of progressive income and estate taxes
and social welfare programs. Whether such initiatives are wise or not is the
ultimate political question. It is difficult to argue, however, that the
Constitution elliptically prevents Congress from softening the hardships
produced by a strictly competitive system. To say that the Constitution
removes such choices from popular government imparts inflexibility to our
entire social system and exacerbates the edges of class divisions. Of course, a
real danger exists that political intervention may destroy, for a time, the
health and vitality of the market. However, the political constraints on market
activity can be loosened and relaxed if conditions become too discouraging
and too devoid of incentive for too many Americans.
It is tempting, therefore, to say that constitutional equality is primarily a
question of separation of powers, and that, in general, equality should mean
what the people, through their democratic institutions, say it means.
Unfortunately, the problem is not that simple, because the judiciary is not
given the luxury of simply standing on the sidelines. The last several decades
of constitutional law have not made the judiciary a partner in the prescriptions
for our economic health, but they have brought about a constitutional theory
of equality which is approaching the more traditional theory of constitutional
liberty. The traditional theory of liberty held that certain inalienable
freedoms of the people were not subject to strict majority rule. Similarly,
certain inalienable rights of equality now exist apart from the sufferance of the
majority. The rights of equality, like the blessings of liberty, are not primarily
economic in character. Instead, the new constitutional rights of equality are
primarily dignitary rights. These include rights to equal expression, to non-
discriminatory treatment, to some threshold access to the political system, to
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basic levels of fair procedural treatment by public bureaucracies, and to equal
application of the laws irrespective of affluence or position. These rights, like
the rights of liberty, will always be the subject of fierce contention, and they
will probably never be recognized in the expansive form that some Americans
would prefer. Yet, because of the convergence of the constitutional theories
supporting liberty and equality, the cause of human dignity has advanced.

